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Abstract
Novel linked employer-employee data for multinational enterprises and their global work-
forces show that multinational enterprises that expand abroad retain more domestic jobs than
competitors without foreign expansions. Propensity-score estimation demonstrates that the foreign
expansion itself is a dominant explanatory factor for reduced worker separation rates. Bounding,
concomitant variable tests, and further robustness checks show competing hypotheses to be less
plausible. The finding is consistent with the hypothesis that, given global wage differences, a
prevention of enterprises from outward FDI would lead to more domestic job losses. FDI raises
domestic-worker retention more pronouncedly among highly educated workers.
KEYWORDS: multinational enterprises, international investment, demand for labor, worker lay-
offs, linked employer-employee data
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1 Introduction
The formation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is a driving force of global inte-
gration. Much empirical research on MNEs investigates the economically important
question how international wage differences affect MNEs’ employment choices.
We investigate in this paper the arguably more policy-relevant question whether
preventing firms from exploiting these wage differences in-house would threaten
even more jobs.
We use a propensity-score matching approach that makes expanding MNEs
comparable to non-expanding firms. Our findings robustly show that foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) expansions turn worker retentions significantly more likely
at MNE home plants compared to domestic competitors without FDI expansions.
Of course, intra-firm trade, as any other form of trade, should lead to employment
shifts away from activities with no comparative advantage. Such labor reallocation,
however, is associated with costs for firms and workers. Our results show MNEs’
employment responses to global trade to be less disruptive than those at domestic
competitors and to provide more job security.
We construct a novel linked employer-employee panel data set for Germany to
conduct the analysis. Job-level data allow us to separate the decision maker (the
MNE) from the treated unit (the job). This special feature and a comprehensive
set of job, worker, plant, MNE and sector characteristics lend particular support to
estimation under propensity-score matching. Propensity-score matching picks pairs
of identical domestic jobs: one job in the pair randomly treated with an expansion
of foreign direct investment (FDI), and the other job untreated. We focus on job
separation as the outcome, a main component of job security that is well defined at
the worker level.1 The estimator then measures how an FDI expansion changes the
probability that a domestic job holder suffers separation.
In recent work, Desai, Foley and Hines (2005a, 2005b) use GDP growth at
an MNE’s foreign location to instrument for FDI expansions. By design, that in-
strumentation strategy excludes FDI at the presence-establishing extensive margin.
About half the home employment effect of FDI in our sample, however, is explained
by adjustment at the extensive margin (Muendler and Becker 2006). Propensity-
score matching is an alternative. It has the additional advantage that, even if an in-
strument covaries with the home employment outcome (say if Eastern European and
German growth were correlated), unrelated worker separations are not attributed to
FDI. The reason is that initial propensity-score estimation controls for MNE and
host-country characteristics and subsequent outcome estimation controls for con-
1Net employment change is not a worker-level outcome. Worker accessions to new jobs are
related to job creation but not directly associated with job security.
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comitant economic changes. Methodological differences notwithstanding, findings
for capital use across locations in Desai et al. (2005a) and for employment security
in our paper are mutually supportive.
There is a separation rate of 14 percent among workers at MNEs, compared to
18 percent for workers at firms with no foreign affiliate.2 Our propensity-score es-
timator shows FDI expansions to explain around half of the four-percentage points
difference. When distinguishing FDI expansions by foreign region, we find signifi-
cant reductions in the rate of job loss of up to seven percent and never find outward
FDI to increase the probability of home worker separation. We find no marked dif-
ference between occupation types, but we find more educated workers to be retained
more frequently after foreign expansions than their less educated colleagues.
We perform a series of robustness checks to quantify the potential influence of
hidden bias (violations of the assumption of selection on observables) and concomi-
tant variables, and probe the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications
and treatment definitions. These checks diminish the plausibility of main com-
peting hypotheses. MNEs may possess ownership advantages, such as innovative
processes or products, prior to FDI expansions. A pre-existing advantage manifests
itself in observables, however, such as prior FDI or higher labor productivity, and
we control for those. More important, firms might acquire an ownership advantage
or experience a favorable demand or productivity shock and simultaneously expand
both home employment and FDI abroad, particularly in fast growing locations. This
identification issue affects both instrumental-variable and propensity-score estima-
tion. We use Rosenbaum (2002) bounds to assess the plausibility of this hypothesis
and estimate that an unobserved confounding factor, such as a simultaneous process
or product innovation, would have to alter the odds of treatment by more than 25
percent to overturn the findings. This implied change is sizeable and unlikely: it
would be equivalent to, for instance, an increase in the share of tertiary-schooled
workers from zero to a hundred percent of the workforce.
There might be simultaneous sector-wide changes, such as trends in foreign
trade, that affect FDI-exposed enterprises differently from domestic firms, but are
unrelated to FDI expansions. Another robustness check queries whether such con-
comitant variables (variables that incidentally vary with the treatment) erroneously
attribute measured effects to the treatment. We find only a slight change of the
estimates, within common confidence bands, and no evidence for erroneous attri-
bution. We examine the explanation with several further checks, using alternative
control-group and treatment definitions, and find overwhelmingly robust estimates.
2These separation rates do not include workers with relatively instable employment histories.
We restrict our sample to workers with a job at some employer twelve months prior to the day when
we observe separation or retention.
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These results suggest that the foreign expansion itself is the strongest explanatory
factor for reduced separation rates.
Several interpretations are consistent with these findings. Vertical foreign ex-
pansions that fragment the production process can lead to cost savings, increased
worldwide market shares, and domestic employment growth. Similarly, horizontal
expansions that duplicate production at foreign locations can lead to improved mar-
ket access with potentially beneficial consequences for headquarters employment.3
The stability afforded by in-house relationships across borders, compared to arm’s
length trade, may result in more stable employment. Foreign expansions may sig-
nal attractive career paths to domestic workers and reduce worker quits (Prendergast
1999).4
To our knowledge, there is to date no job-level research into the effects of MNE
activities. Much existing research investigates how global wage differences predict
home employment at MNEs, using data for firms or higher levels of aggregation.
Although MNEs are important mediators of world trade,5 most existing research
does not find FDI to strongly affect home factor demands. Several studies conclude
that MNE production in low-wage regions has no detectable or only a modest im-
pact on home labor demand at MNEs (Slaughter 2000, Konings and Murphy 2006,
Marin 2006, Harrison, McMillan and Null 2007). An exception is Muendler and
Becker (2006), where we control for location selectivity beyond earlier estimation
strategies and find salient labor substitution across locations, both at the presence-
establishing extensive and the affiliate-operating intensive margin.
In contrast to those approaches, linked employer-employee data allow us to
compare jobs between MNEs and their national competitors. Geishecker (2006)
uses household survey data to study the effect of sectoral intermediate-goods im-
ports on German workers. He finds cross-border outsourcing to reduce individual
employment security. This is not necessarily in contrast to our findings. FDI expan-
sions abroad provide access to both suppliers and clients, and within-firm imports
involve more capital-intensive intermediate goods than cross-firm imports (Antras
2003).
Methodologically related papers include Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), Barba
3In practice, foreign affiliates do not fit the strict vertical-horizontal dichotomy. Feinberg and
Keane (2006) document that less than a third of U.S. MNEs with Canadian affiliates satisfy the
dichotomy; Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007) alert to the importance of export-platform FDI.
4Complementarity between foreign and domestic factors is another candidate interpretation.
Structural cost-function estimates suggest, however, that labor is a strong substitute across locations
(Muendler and Becker 2006).
5UNCTAD (2006) estimates that about a third of world exports originate from foreign affiliates
of MNEs in 1990 and 2005, and that the share of value added at MNE affiliates in world output is
10.1% in 2005, up from 6.7% in 1990.
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Navaretti and Castellani (2004) and Jackle (2006), who apply propensity-score
matching to MNE-level data. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) find no clear difference
in investment behavior between exporters and MNEs. Similarly, Barba Navaretti
and Castellani (2004) and Jackle (2006) do not report significant effects of outward
FDI on MNE home performance for Italian and German MNEs. Beyond prior re-
search, our linked employer-employee data allow the propensity score to account
for multiple sources of heterogeneity—worker, job and plant characteristics beyond
MNE and sector covariates—, and methodologically separate the MNE as decision
maker from the treated job.
The paper has five more sections. Section 2 discusses the methodology, Sec-
tion 3 describes the construction of our linked employer-employee data. We present
the main results in Section 4, and assess competing explanations in Section 5. Sec-
tion 6 concludes. Details of data construction and methodological derivations are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Methodology
Propensity-score matching aims at reducing the bias in treatment-effect estimates
when the sample is not random (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). To fix ideas, con-
sider management boards of two identical firms that vote on a foreign expansion,
given the same observable evidence. Chance, such as accidental access to mar-
ket expertise or the foreign language proficiency of a board member, induces one
board to vote with an edge in favor of expansion, whereas the other board votes
against—creating random variation.
We provide a brief methodological discussion in our context. Our estimator
measures the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), in our case the average
treatment effect of an enterprise’s FDI expansion abroad on the treated domestic
job, which can either be kept or be cut. Absent a random assignment to treatment
and control groups in non-experimental data, confounding factors may distort esti-
mates of the treatment effect. Propensity-score matching removes the bias by com-
paring outcomes between treated and control units (jobs) that are initially identical
and undergo treatment (an enterprise’s FDI expansion abroad) almost randomly. A
crucial assumption is that observable covariates exhaustively determine selection
into treatment. The wealth of information in our data—on the worker, the job, the
plant, the enterprises’s foreign operations and the industry—comprehensively cov-
ers the pretreatment conditions so that treatment is plausibly ascribable to random
changes at the plant, parent-firm or industry level. Beyond typical data sources,
where the treated unit itself chooses selection into treatment, our linked employer-
employee data allows us to separate the treated unit, the individual job, from the
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decision maker, the parent firm. Several tests of underlying assumptions, as well as
a series of specification and robustness checks, assess the method’s validity.
Matching treated units (jobs) on a vector of characteristics suffers dimensional-
ity problems for large sets of characteristics. Propensity-score matching therefore
summarizes pretreatment characteristics into a scalar, the propensity score. Expos-
ing jobs with the same propensity score value to random treatment eliminates the
bias in estimated treatment effects. Define the propensity score as the conditional
probability of receiving treatment given pretreatment characteristics,
p (xi) ≡ Pr(di=1 |xi) = E [di|xi] , (1)
where di is the indicator of job i’s exposure to treatment, taking a value of one iff
the enterprise of job i expands its FDI exposure between years t−1 and t; and xi is
the vector of pretreatment characteristics in year t−1. (We omit time subscripts to
save on notation.)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, if the exposure to treatment is random
within cells defined by xi, it is also random within cells defined by the values of the
scalar propensity score p (xi). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) also show that, if the
propensity score p (xi) is known, the ATT can be defined as
ATT ≡ E [y1i − y0i|di=1] (2)
= E [E [y1i − y0i|di=1, p (xi)]]
= E
[
E [y1i|di=1, p (xi)]− E [y0i|di = 0, p (xi)]
∣∣ di=1],
where outer expectations are over the distribution of p (xi)|di = 1, and yi is the
outcome taking a value of one iff the holder of job i is displaced through a layoff
or quit between t and t+1 (note the one-year lag between treatment and outcome).
To denote the two counterfactual situations of, respectively, treatment and no treat-
ment, we use shorthand notations y1i ≡ (yi|di = 1) and y0i ≡ (yi|di = 0). The
derivation of the ATT estimator requires two intermediate results to hold.
First, the pretreatment variables need to be balanced given a valid propensity
score (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, lemma 1): If p (xi) is the propensity score, then
di ⊥ xi | p (xi). (3)
As a consequence, observations with the same propensity score have the same dis-
tribution of observable (and unobservable) characteristics independent of treatment
status. Put differently, exposure to treatment is random for a given propensity score
so that treated and control jobs are, on average, observationally identical. The or-
thogonality of di and xi conditional on the propensity score is empirically testable.
We perform according balancing tests and compare changes in the goodness of fit
for alternative sets of pretreatment variables xi.
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Second, the assignment of the treatment needs to be unconfounded conditional
on observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, lemma 2). If assign-
ment to treatment is unconfounded, that is if
y1i, y0i ⊥ di | xi, (4)
then assignment to treatment is unconfounded given the propensity score, that is
y1i, y0i ⊥ di | p (xi). (5)
Equation (4) is a maintained assumption of our method. To query unconfounded-
ness, we test whether the predictive power of job-level variables is zero once plant,
parent-firm and sector covariates are included in propensity score estimation.
We estimate the propensity score Pr(di=1 |xi) = F (h(xi)) under the assump-
tion of a logistic cumulated distribution function F (·), where h(xi) is, in principle,
a function of linear and higher-order terms of the covariates. We find linear terms
on our comprehensive set of covariates to suffice for balancing (3) to be satisfied
and omit higher-order terms.
To implement an estimator for the ATT (2), we use the estimated propensity
scores to pick pairs based on nearest-neighbor matching. Denote by C(i) the set of
control units matched to the treated unit i with an estimated value of the propensity
score of pi. Nearest-neighbor matching assignsC(i) ≡ minj ‖ pi−pj ‖, a singleton
unless there are ties (multiple nearest neighbors). In the non-experimental sample,
we observe y1i only for treated jobs and y0i for untreated jobs. The estimator there-
fore uses yTi from the treated subsample as treated outcome and y
C
j from the control
sample as counterfactual outcome y0i. We denote the number of controls matched
to observation i ∈ T by NCi and define weights wij ≡ 1/NCi if j ∈ C(i), and














where NT denotes the number of treated and NC the number of control obser-
vations. Our propensity score estimator is the mean difference in outcomes over
matched pairs.
Estimator (6) is our main specification and based on a binary treatment (whether
or not an MNE expands abroad). For robustness checks, we use Rosenbaum (2002)
bounds and assess the effect that a hypothetical unobserved confounding factor
would need to have so as to overturn the ATT estimate. Beyond the binary ATT
estimator (6), we consider the Hirano and Imbens (2004) extension to propensity-
score estimation to obtain the average causal effect of a continuous treatment (the
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magnitude of an MNE’s foreign expansion). We discuss these extensions in Appen-
dices C and D. We obtain both analytical and bootstrapped standard errors for our
main specifications but find both standard-error estimates to be similar and choose
to report only analytical standard errors.
3 Data
We construct our linked employer-employee data set for the manufacturing sec-
tor from three confidential micro-data sources, assembled at Deutsche Bundesbank
headquarters in Frankfurt, and add industry and country information. We define
enterprises as groups of affiliated domestic and foreign firms and consider all firms
within a group as potential FDI-conducting firms if at least one firm in the group
reports outward FDI activity. We weight the FDI exposure measures by the owner-
ship shares that connect the firms in the group. Firms outside any group with FDI
exposure are classified as domestic firms.
The first component of our linked employer-employee data set, worker and job
information, comes from quarterly files extracted from the social-security records
of the German Federal Labor Agency (BA). The observations are the universe of
workers registered for unemployment insurance in the years 1999-2001, represent-
ing around 80% of the German workforce.6 The files contain worker and job char-
acteristics such as age, education, occupation and wages. Wages in the German
social security data are censored above but not below. The upper bound is the con-
tribution assessment ceiling for old-age insurance, which is annually adjusted for
nominal wage changes.7 We construct plant-level information by aggregation from
the individual-level information.
Second, information on outward FDI comes from the MIDI database (MIcro
database Direct Investment, formerly DIREK), collected by Deutsche Bundesbank
(BuBa); see Lipponer (2003) for a documentation. The MIDI data on outward FDI
cover the foreign affiliates of German MNEs above ownership shares of 10 percent.8
6Coverage includes full- and part-time workers of private enterprises, apprentices, and other
trainees, as well as temporarily suspended employment relationships. Civil servants, student work-
ers, and self-employed individuals are excluded and make up the remaining 20% of the formal-sector
labor force. Plants within the same municipality may report under one single plant identifier.
7The ceiling is at an annual wage income of EUR 52,765 in 2000 and EUR 53,379 in 2001,
except for miners (Knappschaftliche Rentenversicherung) with a ceiling of EUR 65,036 in 2000 and
EUR 65,650 in 2001.
8In 1999 and 2000, reporting is mandatory for all foreign affiliates with a balance sheet total of
more than EUR 5 million and at least a ten-percent ownership share of the German parent and for all
foreign affiliates with a balance sheet total of more than EUR 0,5 million and at least a 50-percent
ownership.
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The German MNEs may in turn be owned by foreign enterprises. The data provide
information on affiliate employment, turnover, and balance sheet items.
Third, in order to link the two data sources on domestic and foreign activities,
we use the commercial corporate structure database MARKUS (from Verband der
Vereine Creditreform) which allows us to identify all domestic parents and affiliates
of FDI-reporting firms. Multinational enterprises are also multi-firm enterprises in
the home economy so that outward FDI affects workers beyond the FDI-reporting
firm’s workforce. Moreover, many German enterprises bundle the domestic man-
agement of their foreign affiliates into legally separate firms (mostly limited lia-
bility GmbHs) for apparent tax and liability reasons. Those bundling firms then
report FDI to MIDI as required by German law. The economic impact of the re-
porting firm’s FDI, however, goes beyond the firm’s formal legal boundary in that
jobs throughout the corporate group can be affected. We consider all firms within
a corporate group (an enterprise) as potential FDI firms if at least one firm in the
group reports outward FDI activities.
The three data sources do not share common firm identifiers. We employ a
string-match procedure to identify clearly identical firms and their plants (see Ap-
pendix A for a detailed description).9 We use the year t = 2000 as our base period
because it is the earliest year for which we have firm structure information and can
adequately attribute outward FDI exposure to domestic jobs. The linked data pro-
vide a cross-section of plants in year t = 2000, including a total of 39,681 treated
and 1,133,920 control plants out of 3.8 million plants in the full worker sample
(1998-2002). Treated plants are those whose firms show an employment expan-
sion at their foreign affiliates. We use a 5% random sample of workers (93,140 job
observations) to reduce estimation runtime to acceptable durations.10
Our worker sample is from t = 2000 and spans the preceding and subsequent
year (from second-quarter BA files, considered most representative for the year at
BA). We restrict the sample to workers at t who also hold a job at some employer
at t − 1 = 1999. This allows us to condition estimation on past worker and job
9We lose observations when combining data from the three sources. But our sample exhibits
largely similar characteristics to the universe. To check whether the MNE data remain representative,
we compare main moments in our combined data to the MIDI universe. Average foreign employment
(turnover) at MNEs in our sample is 2,635 (EUR 752,400) with a standard error of 116 (EUR
39,800), and is 2,281 (EUR 658,900) in the MIDI universe. Foreign employment at the tenth and
ninetieth percentiles of the firm distribution in our sample is 12 and 9,911, and 4 and 9,911 in the
MIDI universe. Because we sample at the job level, we naturally retain larger firms in our combined
sample than in the MIDI universe. Note that the means reported here are somewhat lower than those
displayed in Table 1. The reason is that Table 1 reports averages over workers, whereas the numbers
discussed here are at the firm level.
10The statistical software package (Stata) at BuBa requires the full data matrix to be loaded into
memory so that a runtime of days results when hard drives need to operate virtual memory.
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characteristics. The resulting exclusion of workers with a non-employment spell
twelve months earlier reduces observed separation rates both at MNEs and non-
MNEs. So, the sample restriction also helps us focus our job-security analysis on
workers with relatively stable employment trajectories. Most pretreatment charac-
teristics vary little between t−1 and t, and we simplify the timing of pretreatment
to be at t in some specifications. The treatment period (for changes to a job’s FDI
exposure) runs from t−1 = 1999 (foreign-affiliate balance-sheet closing dates in
1999) to t (closing dates in 2000). The outcome (a worker’s retention or separation)
is observed between t and t+1 = 2001. In the estimation sample, we only keep
workers with continuous employment between t and t+1 = 2001.
We complement the micro-data with annual information on imports by source
country and exports by destination country from the German Federal Statistical
Office and aggregate intermediate-goods imports, final-goods imports, and exports
to world regions by German sector at the NACE 2-digit level.11
Outcomes. Our outcome variable is an indicator of a worker’s separation from
job i. We denote the outcome with yi. It takes a value of one if the holder of the
job is displaced from the employing plant between years t and t+1 (note the one-
year lead between outcome and treatment), and is zero otherwise. This measure of
worker separation includes both quits and layoffs.12 A change of occupation within
the employing plant is not considered a separation.
Treatments. The natural counterpart to separation as a worker-level measure of
the change in gross labor demand is the change in FDI exposure. We mostly focus
on positive exposure changes, or FDI expansions. The binary treatment indicator di
takes a value of one for a job i if the employing enterprise expands its FDI exposure
between years t−1 and t, and zero otherwise. Our main measure of FDI exposure
is employment in foreign affiliates. For robustness checks, we also use the increase
in affiliate turnover (a discrete indicator) and the magnitude of foreign employment
expansions (a continuous treatment variable; Hirano and Imbens (2004)).
Using ownership shares as weights, we attribute FDI exposure measures to re-
lated firms and their jobs within the corporate group (see Appendix B for details of
the procedure). We compute cumulated and consolidated ownership shares for all
German firms that are in the same corporate group with at least one FDI-reporting
firm. Cumulating means adding all direct and indirect ownership shares of a parent
11We calculate intermediate-goods imports by foreign location using import shares in sector in-
puts as reported by the German Federal Statistical Office under the assumption that source-country
frequencies are similar for intermediate-goods imports and final-goods imports.
12The German social-security records do not distinguish quits from layoffs.
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firm in a given affiliate. Consolidation removes the degree of self-ownership (α)
from affiliates, or intermediate firms between parents and affiliates, and rescales the
ultimate ownership share of the parent to account for the increased control in partly
self-owning affiliates or intermediate firms (with a factor of 1/(1−α)).
We compute worldwide affiliate employment (WW) as well as region-specific
affiliate employments. For the region-specific measures, we define four main for-
eign regions (see Table 11), among them two high-wage and two low-wage lo-
cations: Asia-Pacific Developing countries (APD), Central and Eastern European
countries (CEE), European Monetary Union participating countries (EMU),13 and
Overseas Industrialized countries (OIN). We omit other developing countries, non-
EMU member countries in Western Europe, and Russia and the Central Asian coun-
tries to create more homogeneous individual locations. World-wide (WW) expan-
sions, however, include all countries. When we consider region-specific treatments,
our baseline control group includes jobs at firms that exhibit no expansion in the
region but possibly an expansion in any other region.
Covariates. We use a rich set of covariates to conduct propensity-score match-
ing. The covariates are: worker characteristics (age, gender, education, monthly
wage);14 job characteristics (part-time or temporary work, apprenticeship, minor
employment, occupation);15 domestic plant characteristics (workforce size, work-
force composition by worker and job characteristics, an East-West indicator); pa-
rent-firm foreign activity (foreign affiliate employment and turnover in four world
regions); as well as sector-level measures of German foreign trade. To control for
plant-level differences in productivity, we also estimate the plant-fixed component
in German wages from a Mincer (1974) regression with June 2000 workers and
include the plant-specific measure among the pretreatment characteristics. To the
extent that FDI exposure is the result of enterprise characteristics such as productiv-
ity or capital intensity, we condition on the enterprise’s past FDI exposure to control
for their FDI-relevant aspects.
Descriptive statistics. Table 1 displays summary statistics for our main sample
of workers in the manufacturing sector, separately for MNE and non-MNE plants.
13Twelve EU member countries that participate in Euro area in 2001, excluding non-participating
EMU signatories.
14For schooling, we report differences between workers with and without tertiary schooling (be-
yond university-qualifying Abitur). Tertiary schooled workers have a college degree or are certified
professionals who completed professional training or an apprenticeship program instead of college.
15In contrast to part-time work under an open-ended contract, temporary work status includes
working family members in agriculture, employees past retirement age with temporary contracts,
and sporadically employed workers.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: MNE AND NON-MNE SUBSAMPLES
MNEs non-MNEs
mean s.d. mean s.d.
Outcome: Worker separation
Indic.: Displaced between t and t+1 .14 .34 .18 .38
Treatment: FDI exposure and expansion
Employment abroad in t−1 (1,000s) 3.99 6.10 .00 .00
Indic.: Empl. growth abroad t−1 to t .64 .48 .02 .15
Worker-level variables
Annual wage in EUR 35,317.8 11,611.6 26,847.8 13,872.2
Age 41.01 10.44 40.69 11.77
Female .23 .42 .33 .47
White-collar worker .44 .50 .38 .49
Tertiary schooling .16 .37 .08 .28
Current apprentice .02 .15 .04 .19
Part-time employed .05 .21 .12 .33
Plant-level variables
Employment at domestic plant 2,683.8 7,935.3 926.9 3,153.3
Indic.: Plant in East Germany .09 .29 .10 .30
Number of observations 38,041 55,099
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed
and non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Indicator variables (Indic.) take a value of one if the
described condition is satisfied.
Separation rates differ markedly across MNE plants and non-MNE plants. 14 per-
cent of workers employed in both 1999 and 2000 separate from MNE plants be-
tween the years 2000 and 2001, compared to 18 percent of workers from non-MNE
plants.
In contrast to public perception, separation rates are lower in MNE plants than
in non-MNE plants in the majority of manufacturing sectors, independent of the
region of foreign investment (see Table 12 in the Appendix for separation probabil-
ities by sector and region). The only exceptions are the chemical industry, where
worker separation is lower in non-MNE plants, and the non-electrical machinery,
electronics and optical equipment sector where separation rates do not differ be-
tween MNE and non-MNE plants.
A German MNE with domestic manufacturing plants employs around 4,000
workers abroad on average. 64% of the workers in MNE plants are subject to a
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foreign employment expansion between the years 1999 and 2000, whereas only 2%
of the workers in non-MNE plants see their employer become an MNE for the first
time and expand abroad.
MNE plants differ from non-MNE plants in several further dimensions. Workers
in MNE plants earn more, are more highly educated, more likely to be white-collar
workers, and less likely to be part-time employed than workers in non-MNE plants.
MNE plants are bigger on average than non-MNE plants. Median employment is
644 and 103 for MNE and non-MNE plants, respectively.
4 Estimates
We investigate the effect of FDI expansions abroad on worker separation in the
MNE’s home labor market, conditional on past levels of MNE activity. FDI expan-
sions (positive changes to FDI exposure) are the natural counterpart to separation as
a worker-level measure of changes in labor demand. We choose a research design
that contrasts changes (in outcomes) with changes (in treatment), rather than levels
with levels, to lend more credibility to the balancing assumptions on pre-treatment
characteristics. Table 13 in the Appendix shows for individual manufacturing sec-
tors that separation probabilities from jobs exposed to FDI expansions are around
two to five percent lower than from jobs not exposed to FDI expansions—similar
to the unconditional four-percent difference between MNE and non-MNE status
(Table 1).
We first estimate the propensity of FDI treatment using worker, job, plant, MNE
and sector characteristics. The economic idea is to assign a propensity score to
every job observation for subsequent comparison between jobs that were treated
and observably identical jobs that were not treated. We provide evidence that
propensity-score matching balances indeed the treated and control job sub-samples.
Our comprehensive set of predictors covers relevant pre-treatment dimensions so
that remaining differences are arguably random in nature. We then obtain ATT esti-
mates of FDI expansions region by region, using nearest-neighbor matching based
on the predicted propensity scores.
4.1 Propensity score estimation
The dependent variable in propensity score estimation is the binary indicator of
an FDI expansion in region ` between 1999 and 2000. We start by looking at an
indicator of at least one expansion in any foreign region (a worldwide expansion
` = WW ) and then discern region-specific expansions (` =APD, CEE, EMU,
12
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 8 [2008], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 8
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol8/iss1/art8
OIN). All our specifications control for current FDI exposure (the employment level
in four world regions).
Table 2 displays odds ratios and corresponding standard errors of logit propen-
sity score estimates for WW expansions (expansions anywhere worldwide). An
odds ratio of one corresponds to no effect. Our basic specification 1 (in columns 1
and 2 of Table 2) includes only worker characteristics alongside the FDI presence
controls. We use worker characteristics from June 2000 to start (and add lagged
worker characteristics for 1999 in specification 4). With the exception of age, all
worker characteristics are significant predictors of FDI expansion in this short re-
gression. Conditional on other worker and job characteristics, workers with higher
wages, females and workers in non-standard forms of employment (minor employ-
ment, temporary job, apprentice position, part-time job) are more likely to be sub-
ject to FDI expansions.
In specification 2, we add plant characteristics (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2).
All worker and job characteristics turn insignificant once plant variables are in-
cluded. The loss of predictive power at the job level is consistent with the hypothe-
sis that FDI expansions are not systematically related to workers or jobs, but based
on separate decisions. This lends particular credibility to propensity-score match-
ing. Lacking significance of job-level covariates is not an indication that higher
levels of aggregation would satisfy requirements for propensity-sore matching. At
the employer level, for instance, decision-making and treated unit would no longer
be separate and subject to potential confounding of treatment and outcome. Among
the plant variables is a plant-fixed wage effect from a Mincer regression to control
for plant-level differences in labor productivity, which theory suggests to be a factor
for selection into foreign expansions (e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple 2004).
We estimate propensity scores under two further specifications but find results
to change little. Specification 3 (not reported) adds three types of sector-level con-
trols of foreign trade: imports of intermediate inputs, imports of final goods, and
exports. In addition to the covariates from all prior specifications, specification 4
also includes lagged wages and lagged plant information.16 In those specifications,
worker- and job-level controls remain insignificant and coefficients on plant-level
covariates change little, also remaining significant.
In summary, plant, MNE and sector characteristics are significant and eco-
nomically important covariates of FDI expansions, both for worldwide and region-
specific FDI expansions. This shows that FDI expansions themselves are not ran-
dom but a choice predictable by plant, MNE and sector characteristics. For we use
a comprehensive set of worker, job, plant, MNE and sector variables, an arguably
16We include the worker’s lagged wage in any prior job and do not restrict the sample to workers
with two consecutive years of employment at the same plant.
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Table 2: PROPENSITY SCORE SPECIFICATIONS
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 4
Odds Std. Odds Std. Odds Std.
Ratio Err. Ratio Err. Ratio Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Worker-level variables
Age .994 .006 1.005 .006 1.011 .006
Age-squared 1.003 .007 .994 .007 .987 .007
Log Wage 4.980 .149∗∗∗ 1.039 .040 1.073 .059
Indic.: Female 1.242 .027∗∗∗ 1.027 .024 1.022 .025
Indic.: Tertiary schooling 1.097 .028∗∗∗ .969 .027 .958 .027
Job-level variables
Indic.: White-collar job .748 .015∗∗∗ 1.016 .023 .995 .023
Indic.: Minor employment 4.967 .433∗∗∗ 1.215 .124 1.237 .128
Indic.: Temporary job 1.838 .154∗∗∗ 1.095 .098 1.024 .095
Indic.: Apprentice 2.584 .260∗∗∗ .972 .107 1.086 .123
Indic.: Part-time job 1.549 .067∗∗∗ 1.005 .048 1.029 .050
Plant-level variables
Employment 1.000 1.60e-06∗∗∗ 1.000 4.82e-06∗∗∗
Average workforce age .983 .003∗∗∗ .986 .003∗∗∗
Log wage FE 2.743 .491∗∗∗ 2.560 .460∗∗∗
Annual average wage 1.001 .00008∗∗∗ 1.001 .00008∗∗∗
Share: Females 1.353 .100∗∗∗ 1.340 .109∗∗∗
Share: Tertiary schooling 1.216 .132∗ 1.525 .175∗∗∗
Share: White-collar jobs .548 .045∗∗∗ .877 .074∗
Share: Minor employments .464 .098∗∗∗ .379 .081∗∗∗
Share: Temporary jobs 1.395 .600 12.946 5.540
Share: Apprentices .033 .016∗∗∗ .005 .002∗∗∗
Share: Part-time jobs .454 .074∗∗∗ .536 .087∗∗∗
Indic.: in East Germany 2.183 .086∗∗∗ 2.107 .086∗∗∗
Const. 1.60e-06 3.93e-07∗∗∗ .056 .020∗∗∗ .050 .020∗∗∗
Sector controls yes yes
Lagged predictors yes yes
Obs. 93,140 93,140 93,140
Pseudo R2 .069 .135 .165
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed and non-FDI
exposed manufacturing plants. Controlling for lagged levels of MNE employment in all world regions.
Standard errors: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗ five, ∗∗∗ one percent.
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considerable part of the unexplained variation in treatment probabilities is likely due
to unobserved variations in host location characteristics. There is no evidence that
FDI expansions are systematically related to workers or jobs. This lends additional
support to the tenet that matching pairs of treated and control jobs by propensity
score provides us with comparable samples for inference. Consequently, we dis-
card specification 1, which included only worker and job variables.
4.2 Covariate balancing
Based on the estimated propensity score, we use nearest-neighbor matching to com-
bine treated and control observations.17 As Table 3 shows, our sample contains
15,000 to 25,000 treated jobs and 65,000 to 75,000 matched control jobs (columns 1
and 2), depending on region of expansion and specification. So, before matching,
treated jobs make up between 15 and 25 percent of the estimation sample (col-
umn 3).
Covariate balancing assesses matching quality. Table 3 shows matching quality
indicators for specifications 2, 3 and 4 by region of foreign expansion. Our first
matching statistic, the pseudo R2 from logit estimation of the conditional prob-
ability of FDI expansion, indicates the degree to which regressors xi predict the
treatment probability (columns 4 and 5). After matching, regressors xi should have
no explanatory power for selection into treatment if the treatment and matched con-
trol samples have balanced characteristics. Our results show that this is the case.
The pseudo R2 statistics drop from between 13 and 28 percent to between 2 and 7
percent.
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) propose a comparison between (standardized)
treated unit means and (standardized) control unit means before and after matching
as a second evaluation method for covariate balance. The standardized differences
(standardized biases) between the means for a covariate xi are defined as:
Bbefore(xi) = 100 · x¯i1 − x¯i0√
V1(xi) + V2(xi)/2
Bafter(xi) = 100 · x¯i1M − x¯i0M√
V1(xi) + V2(xi)/2
,
where x¯i1 denotes the treated unit mean and x¯i0 the control unit mean for covariate
xi. As is commonly done in the evaluation literature, we show the median absolute
17We use a version of Edwin Leuven and Barbara Sianesi’s Stata module psmatch2 (2003, version
3.0.0, http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html) to perform propensity-score matching and
covariate balance testing.
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Table 3: COVARIATE BALANCING, BEFORE AND AFTER MATCHING
No. of No. of Share of Logit Logit Median Median Share of
treated controls treated ps. R2 ps. R2 bias bias treated
before before after before after lost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Specification 2: Worker and plant characteristics
WW 25,640 67,500 .275 .131 .035 18.306 2.637 .00004
APD 14,643 78,497 .157 .195 .051 17.481 3.049 .002
CEE 18,914 74,226 .203 .147 .052 13.570 5.180 .0005
EMU 21,759 71,381 .234 .174 .055 19.583 3.412 .000
OIN 17,974 75,166 .193 .240 .055 16.878 5.652 .000
Specification 3: Spec. 2 plus sector-level trade measures
WW 25,640 67,500 .275 .159 .031 18.742 3.682 .0002
APD 14,643 78,497 .157 .231 .021 25.274 2.935 .066
CEE 18,914 74,226 .203 .179 .059 18.648 6.692 .002
EMU 21,759 71,381 .234 .205 .036 20.926 3.272 .0002
OIN 17,974 75,166 .193 .280 .058 25.014 5.912 .000
Specification 4: Spec. 3 plus lagged wage and lagged plant size
WW 25,640 67,500 .275 .162 .037 19.262 3.608 .0001
APD 14,643 78,497 .157 .232 .067 25.580 3.092 .003
CEE 18,914 74,226 .203 .180 .064 20.115 4.766 .002
EMU 21,759 71,381 .234 .205 .038 22.389 2.922 .0002
OIN 17,974 75,166 .193 .284 .075 26.703 6.327 .001
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI-exposed and non-FDI exposed
manufacturing plants. Locations (see Table 11): WW (World-Wide abroad), APD (Asia-Pacific Developing countries),
CEE (Central and Eastern European countries), EMU (European Monetary Union member countries), and OIN (Overseas
Industrialized countries).
standardized bias before (Bbefore(xi)) and after matching (Bafter(xi)), over all regres-
sors xi that enter the propensity score estimation (columns 6 and 7). Across regions
of treatment and specifications, matching reduces the median absolute standardized
bias by 70 to 90 percent. There seem to be no formal criteria in the literature to
judge the size of standardized bias. Yet the remaining bias between 2 and 7 percent
is in the same range as in microeconomic evaluation studies (e.g. Lechner (2002)
and Sianesi (2004)).18 In the post-matching standardized difference only treated
units enter whose values fall within the common support with the control units.
We impose a strict caliper of 1% to discard treated units outside the common sup-
port, but the share of treated observations outside the common support is miniscule
(column 8).
There is no single specification with a bias consistently lower than that of other
specifications for all regions. Other balancing statistics, such as those based on
goodness-of-fit measures (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), for instance), tend
to favor richer specifications over more parsimonious specifications. Heckman and
18Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest that a value of 20 is “large.”
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Table 4: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT ON THE TREATED
ATT
OLS Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
worker & plant adding sector adding lagged
predictors predictors to (2) predictors to (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WW -.045 -.021 -.014 -.026
(.003)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.012) (.009)∗∗∗
APD -.043 -.007 -.019 -.069
(.003)∗∗∗ (.018) (.007)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗
CEE -.045 -.027 -.019 -.068
(.003)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.013) (.017)∗∗∗
EMU -.043 -.031 -.022 -.007
(.003)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗ (.011)
OIN -.035 -.039 -.002 -.056
(.003)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013) (.018)∗∗∗
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed
and non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Controlling for lagged levels of MNE employment in
all world regions. Analytic standard errors in parentheses: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗ five, ∗∗∗ one
percent.
Navarro Lozano (2004) show, however, that adding variables that are statistically
significant in the treatment choice equation does not necessarily result in a set of
conditioning variables that satisfy the unconfoundedness assumption. We therefore
do not select a single specification of the propensity score based on goodness-of-fit
measures. Instead, we compare results from specifications 2, 3 and 4.
Overall, observable characteristics between treated and control observations are
well balanced after propensity-score matching. To test the sensitivity of our results
with respect to hypothetical unobserved influences, we will use Rosenbaum (2002)
bounds after ATT estimation.
4.3 Average treatment effect on the treated
Having formed a matched sample of treated and control jobs, we estimate the ATT.
Table 4 contrasts the results from propensity-score specifications 2 through 4 with
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the treatment effect. We report analytic
standard errors.
Across specifications, the ATT estimate for an expansion in affiliate employ-
ment anywhere worldwide ranges between -.014 and -.023 percent. So, worldwide
employment expansions reduce the probability of domestic worker separation by
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about 2 percentage points, or around half of the difference of 4 percentage points
that OLS estimation detects (columns 1) and that we also found in unconditional
differences between MNEs and non-MNEs (Table 1). We attribute the identified
two-percent difference from propensity-score estimation to the foreign employment
expansion itself.
We separate the ATT by region of foreign expansion to discern contributing
expansions behind the measured worldwide ATT effect. The region-specific ATT
estimates are again negative in all four cases. In specifications 2 (worker and plant
predictors of treatment only) and 3 (sector predictors in addition to worker and
plant variables), all estimated treatment effects are negative, though not always
statistically significant. Although specifications 2 and 3 exhibited more favorable
balancing properties than specification 4 for some regions, we regard the richest
specification 4 to be our chief one. In specification 4, we keep sector predictors of
treatment as in specification 3 but add lagged covariates from specification 2. Ex-
cept for EMU, point estimates are overall higher than in either prior specification.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that the domestic-worker retention effect of
FDI expansions may be underestimated when not controlling for past determinants
of plant performance.19
In the richest specification 4, ATT point estimates for APD, CEE and OIN ex-
ceed the OLS estimates in absolute value. So, when controlling for a possibly large
set of treatment predictors, the detected ATT is even stronger than the unconditional
difference in separation rates between expanding and non-expanding MNEs would
suggest. This lends additional support to the hypothesis that it is the foreign em-
ployment expansion itself which contributes to reduced domestic separation rates.
Expansions into low-income economies are sometimes associated with vertical
FDI, while those into high-income locations are considered to be more likely hori-
zontal. Our estimates do not suggest a clear distinction by host income levels, while
specification 4 points to a weaker effect of expansions into neighboring locations in
the EMU and a stronger effect for expansions into distant locations. Interestingly,
expansions into low-wage regions like Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and re-
mote high-wage locations such as OIN (including, Japan, the U.S. and Canada) pre-
dict treatment effects of similar magnitude. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that, while horizontal expansion motives may outweigh factor-cost savings motives
in some regions and not others, the performance effect on home separation rates is
similar. It is also consistent with findings by Feinberg and Keane (2006) that MNEs
simultaneously pursue horizontal and vertical investment strategies in the same host
19In our regional specifications, firms that do not expand into region ` are classified as controls
but may expand in any other region. When we fix the control group to jobs only at firms who do
not expand anywhere (the control group of the WW estimator), all point estimates continue to be
negative and similar in magnitude but lose significance in some regions.
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location. It is conceivable that performance gains of expansions within the highly
integrated Euro area are small compared to non-expansions so that one might ex-
pect lacking significance for effects of EMU expansions. The ATT for expansions
into EMU countries is indeed not statistically significant.
To summarize, in no single specification and for no single region is there a
positive treatment effect. Our estimates invariably point towards reduced domestic-
worker separation rates at foreign-employment expanding MNEs relative to non-
expanding firms. An important branch of the prior literature uses simultaneous
factor demand models, motivated by cost-function estimation, to assess the own-
wage and cross-wage substitution elasticities for labor demand across regions—
measuring factor-price effects while conditioning on output, as cost function esti-
mation requires. In conditioning on current output, however, cost-function estima-
tion precludes firm performance, as manifested by firm product market shares for
instance, from affecting labor demand. The research design of the current study is
guided by the complementary question, whether foreign expansions alter firm per-
formance in the home labor market. Though we condition on pre-treatment charac-
teristics of workers and plants (at t−1), we do not restrict the outcome between t
and t+1 in any way. Given the factor-cost and product market environment across
foreign locations, in which globally competing firms operate, MNEs that expand
abroad retain more workers at home.
4.4 Worker and job heterogeneity
Employment expansions at MNEs abroad may affect workers and jobs differentially
depending on their skill level. We use the job-level data to distinguish between ed-
ucation groups of workers and between jobs by skill intensity. Results show that
FDI expansions in any foreign location increase domestic-worker retention rates for
both education groups and for both job types—with no single statistically signifi-
cant exception.20
Table 5 presents results for workers with and without tertiary education (beyond
university-qualifying Abitur). Especially in specifications 2 and 3, worker-retention
effects are typically stronger for workers with a tertiary schooling degree than for
workers with less education. In our richest specification 4, we find FDI expan-
sions anywhere worldwide to reduce separation rates by 11.9 percentage points
for domestic workers with tertiary schooling but by only 2.7 percentage points for
workers with less education. Employment expansions in EMU participants have no
significant effect in specification 4.
20Observations for workers with tertiary education, or skill-intensive occupations, are more likely
to be truncated at the upper-income ceiling than those for other education and skill groups.
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Table 5: ATT, HIGH AND LOW EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
ATT
OLS Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
worker & plant adding sector adding lagged
predictors predictors to (2) predictors to (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WORKERS WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION
WW -.045 -.029 -.071 -.119
(.007)∗∗∗ (.032) (.016)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗
APD -.034 -.076 .002 -.008
(.008)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.043) (.046)
CEE -.048 -.118 -.144 -.057
(.008)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.041)
EMU -.029 -.068 -.095 -.004
(.008)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗ (.034)
OIN -.025 -.046 -.122 -.018
(.008)∗∗∗ (.027)∗ (.041)∗∗∗ (.041)
WORKERS WITH LESS THAN TERTIARY EDUCATION
WW -.045 -.019 -.028 -.027
(.003)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
APD -.045 -.060 -.023 -.021
(.004)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.018) (.018)
CEE -.046 -.019 -.029 -.027
(.003)∗∗∗ (.011)∗ (.016)∗ (.013)∗∗
EMU -.047 -.023 -.006 -.013
(.003)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.011) (.009)
OIN -.038 -.028 -.039 -.041
(.003)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed and non-FDI exposed
manufacturing plants. Controlling for lagged levels of MNE employment in all world regions. Analytic standard errors in
parentheses: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗ five, ∗∗∗ one percent. Number of observations: 10,652 workers with tertiary schooling
and 82,488 workers with less than tertiary education.
Table 6 repeats the exercise with a distinction between white-collar and blue-
collar jobs. Interestingly, white-collar jobs exhibit hardly any statistically signifi-
cant ATT. Though worker-retention effects of foreign employment expansions are
significant for blue-collar workers, we find no clear differences in the ATT point
estimates. The job-securing effect of foreign employment expansions appears to be
shared across occupations.
5 Robustness Checks
Propensity-score estimation of the ATT suggests that expansions abroad lead to
more frequent worker retentions at home. We argue that the most plausible expla-
nation for added job security at FDI-expanding firms is indeed the FDI expansion
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Table 6: ATT, WHITE-COLLAR AND BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS
ATT
OLS Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
worker & plant adding sector adding lagged
predictors predictors to (2) predictors to (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
WW -.045 -.041 -.051 -.022
(.004)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.024)
APD -.041 -.042 -.018 -.012
(.005)∗∗∗ (.021)∗ (.027) (.043)
CEE -.049 -.022 -.023 -.026
(.005)∗∗∗ (.024) (.034) (.025)
EMU -.036 -.026 -.021 -.011
(.004)∗∗∗ (.019) (.020) (.016)
OIN -.036 -.017 -.020 -.023
(.005)∗∗∗ (.026) (.019) (.022)
BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS
WW -.045 -.016 -.035 -.023
(.004)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
APD -.045 -.008 -.021 -.022
(.005)∗∗∗ (.009) (.009)∗∗ (.009)∗∗
CEE -.044 -.017 -.011 -.009
(.004)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.008) (.008)
EMU -.051 -.044 -.037 -.037
(.004)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
OIN -.036 -.010 .004 .007
(.004)∗∗∗ (.011) (.012) (.013)
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed and non-FDI exposed
manufacturing plants. Controlling for lagged levels of MNE employment in all world regions. Analytic standard errors
in parentheses: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗ five, ∗∗∗ one percent. Number of observations: 37,977 white-collar and 55,163
blue-collar workers.
itself. To make the case, we investigate main competing hypotheses that might give
rise to a similar worker-retention pattern of FDI expansions, and find those compet-
ing hypotheses to be considerably less plausible.
MNEs arguably possess ownership advantages, such as innovative processes
or products, prior to FDI expansions. A pre-existing advantage manifests itself in
observables, however, such as prior FDI or higher labor productivity, and we con-
trol for a possibly large set of such predictors in Section 4. In this Section, we
perform a series of robustness checks to investigate two more critical competing
hypotheses: First, firms might acquire an ownership advantage or experience a fa-
vorable demand or productivity shock and simultaneously expand FDI, but retain
more domestic workers because of the newly acquired ownership advantage. Sec-
ond, simultaneous sector-wide changes, such as trends in foreign trade, may affect
FDI-exposed enterprises differently from domestic firms but be unrelated to FDI ex-
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pansions and incidentally retain more domestic workers. We quantify the potential
influence of hidden bias (violations of the assumption of selection on observables)
to assess the plausibility of the former competing hypothesis, and we check for
concomitant variables to assess the plausibility of the latter competing hypothesis.
5.1 Sensitivity analysis with Rosenbaum bounds
Our first robustness check probes the plausibility of the competing hypothesis that
unobserved confounding factors lead us to erroneously attribute additional worker
retentions to foreign expansions. An unobserved confounding factor could be that
firms acquire an ownership advantage over the course of the treatment year or expe-
rience a favorable productivity or demand shock and therefore retain more domestic
workers, simultaneously expanding FDI. We use Rosenbaum (2002) bounds to esti-
mate how large the effect of a hypothetically unobserved confounding factor would
have to be to overturn our ATT estimate (see Appendix C for a detailed description).
Note that for an unobserved variable to be a source of selection bias, it must
affect the probability that a job receives the treatment and must affect the outcome.
In particular, an unobserved variable that differentially affects subgroups of jobs
in the treatment group, but that does not have an effect on the outcome beyond
the variables already controlled for, does not challenge the robustness of our re-
sults. Examples of such variables are economic changes or political reforms at the
MNE’s host locations, exchange rate moves, or varying trade costs. Only if groups
of jobs differ on unobserved variables that simultaneously affect the assignment to
treatment and the outcome, a hidden bias may arise on unobserved heterogeneity.
We want to determine how strongly a hypothetically unobserved job-related vari-
able would have to be to influence the selection process so that it could undermine
the results of our matching analysis.
We perform a sensitivity analysis for all statistically significant ATT effects.
For this purpose, we gradually increase the level of the critical value of the odds
ratio where inference about the treatment effect starts to be overturned. We find
that the critical value, for which the statistically significant ATT effects in Table 4
would become statistically indistinguishable from zero, varies between 1.15 and
1.25. Consider the effect of employment expansions in CEE under specification 4,
for instance. We find the critical odds-ratio value to be 1.25. This means that all
jobs with the same observed x-vector can differ in their odds of treatment by a factor
of up to 1.25, or 25 percent, before the confidence band around the ATT estimate
starts to include zero. This is a worst-case scenario. A critical value of 1.25 does
not imply that there is indeed unobserved heterogeneity or that there is no effect
of treatment on the outcome variable. A critical value of 1.25 only means that a
hypothetical unobserved variable, such as a newly acquired ownership advantage
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or a favorable demand or productivity shock, would need to have an odds ratio of
1.25 to completely determine the outcome for the matched job pairs and overturn
our ATT estimate.
Table 2 gives an idea of what an odds ratio of 1.25 on a hypothetical binary vari-
able compares to. The coefficient on the fraction of workers with tertiary schooling
in the plant’s workforce is 1.216 (column 2 of Table 2). An unobserved effect chal-
lenging our conclusions would thus have to be stronger than the effect of raising
the share of tertiary schooled workers from zero to 100 percent in the mean plant’s
workforce. We consider it implausible that a newly acquired ownership advan-
tage, or any other favorable productivity or demand shock outside our rich list of
regressors, would exert such strong an impact. We therefore view the statistically
significant ATT treatment effects as robust to hidden bias.
5.2 Concomitant variables
Our second robustness check queries whether changes in foreign trade are con-
comitant predictors that incidentally covary with the treatment so that we would er-
roneously attribute FDI effects to the ATT. To gauge the effect of concomitant trade
variables, we take the matched job sample and regress the outcome on the treatment
indicator in the matched sample. This gives an ATT estimate (Rosenbaum 1984).
We add to this regression 21 variables on sector-level changes in intermediate-goods
imports, final-goods imports, and exports between t and t+1, separately for seven
world regions. To exhaustively reflect German foreign trade, we include among
the concomitant variables regressors for Other Developing countries (ODV), Other
Western European countries (OWE) and Russia and Central Asian countries (RCA),
beyond the four regions APD, CEE, EMU and OIN. In addition, we include an indi-
cator whether the plant’s firm was an MNE in the preceding period. Table 7 reports
the results of this exercise for foreign-employment expansions anywhere worldwide
under specification 4. Only one of the coefficients on the concomitant sector vari-
ables is statistically different from zero at the five-percent level. (Table 7 does not
report the insignificant coefficient estimates for ODV, OWE and RCA.) Past MNE
status of the plant’s firm is not a significant predictor.21 The most plausible explana-
tion for lower separation rates at FDI-expanding firms is thus their FDI expansion
itself.
21Note that OLS likely overstates significance. OLS replication regressions systematically under-
state standard errors. Whereas ATT standard errors take into account the repeated use of matched
control observations, OLS regressions treat them as if they were independent observations. This
is apparent from the standard error of .009 in Table 4 (column 4) with a standard error of .003 in
Table 7 (column 1). The literature does not yet provide methods to adequately adjust standard errors
in OLS replication regressions with controls.
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Table 7: CONCOMITANT VARIABLES
ATT repl. ATT with ATT with
regression controls 1 controls 2
(1) (2) (3)
WW treatment effect -.029 -.026 -.028
(.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗



























Indic.: MNE plant (t− 1) .004
(.005)
Obs. 41,107 41,107 41,107
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in
FDI exposed and non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Coefficient estimates for
ODV, OWE and RCA not reported (all insignificant). Analytic standard errors in
parentheses: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗ five, ∗∗∗ one percent. Regression on matched
sample, including a constant. Changes in imports and exports at NACE 2-digit sector
level.
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Table 8: ROBUSTNESS OF ATT
ATT
OLS Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4
worker & plant adding sector adding lagged
predictors predictors to (2) predictors to (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main sample (from Table 4)
1. WW -.045 -.021 -.014 -.026
(.003)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗ (.012) (.009)∗∗∗
Alternative random sample
2. WW -.042 -.020 -.039 -.040
(.003)∗∗∗ (.010)∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Restricted control group: non-expanding MNEs
3. WW -.020 -.023 -.029 -.038
(.004)∗∗∗ (.016) (.016)∗ (.010)∗∗∗
Alternative treatment: foreign turnover expansion
4. WW -.042 -.067 -.065 -.038
(.003)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗
Converse treatment: foreign employment contraction
5. WW -.011 .001 .005 .012
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005) (.005) (.005)∗∗
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed and
non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Controlling for lagged levels of MNE employment in all
world regions. Analytic standard errors in parentheses: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗ five, ∗∗∗ one percent.
Treatment is foreign employment expansion unless otherwise noted, control group includes both
MNEs with no expansion and non-MNEs unless otherwise noted.
5.3 Additional robustness checks
We perform several additional robustness checks under alternative sample, control-
group and treatment definitions to corroborate the plausibility of our hypothesis that
foreign FDI expansions raise the retention rate of workers at home.
Alternative random sample. In drawing the five-percent worker sample and con-
ducting propensity score matching, we restrict ourselves to a single random seed in
all routines. We tried alternative seeds. In Table 8 (row 2), we report results from
the alternative random seed that resulted in point estimates farthest from our orig-
inal result in absolute value for specification 4. Estimates across all specifications
reinforce our main findings.
Restricting the control group to non-expanding MNEs. The control group in-
cludes jobs at non-MNEs. A concern is that non-MNE jobs make an unreasonable
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comparison group to jobs at expanding MNEs. Although the propensity score esti-
mator is not likely to pair-up jobs with strongly different attributes as nearest neigh-
bors, the inclusion of non-MNE jobs in the control group might affect estimates. To
assess the importance of non-MNE jobs in the control group, we exclude all non-
MNE jobs and restrict the control group to workers at non-expanding MNEs. We
report results in Table 8 (row 3). Interestingly, the OLS estimate now drops to the
ATT level, while point estimates across all ATT specifications reinforce our main
findings.
Foreign turnover expansion as treatment. Measuring the treatment with an FDI
expansion in terms of foreign employment buildups is natural in our context where
the outcome is domestic worker retention or separation. Turnover at foreign af-
filiates is an alternative treatment variable. We repeat the full propensity-score
matching procedure and subsequent ATT estimation, now defining treatment as
an increase in foreign-affiliate turnover. Results in Table 8 (row 4) show that all
point estimates continue to be negative. Under specification 4, turnover expansions
anywhere worldwide (WW) reduce the separation rate of domestic workers by 3.8
percentage points. This ATT is considerably stronger than the benchmark estimate
of 2.9 percent (row 1).
Foreign employment contraction as treatment. We investigate the converse
treatment: firms that contract foreign employment. As Table 4 (row 5) shows,
OLS estimates would indicate that firms with foreign employment contractions re-
tain fewer workers than firms with expansions, but that, surprisingly, contracting
MNEs add to job security security compared to non-contracting MNEs and non-
MNEs. Propensity score estimation, in contrast, demonstrates that foreign employ-
ment contractions make domestic jobs less, not more, secure. Specification 4 pre-
dicts that a foreign employment contraction is associated with a 1.2 percent higher
rate of worker displacements from domestic jobs.
Alternative treatment thresholds. We investigate the sensitivity of our ATT es-
timates to the choice of cutoff for a foreign employment expansion. In the base-
line definition of a foreign expansion so far, we consider an employment buildup
of any magnitude. We now turn to alternative expansion thresholds that redefine
the outward-FDI treatment increasingly restrictively with 1 percent, 5 percent, and
10 percent foreign employment expansions. We re-estimate specification 4 under
those redefined treatments. As Table 9 shows, we find overwhelmingly robust point
estimates. The ATT estimates are most frequently statistically significant when
considering more-than-five-percent employment expansions as treatment. For the
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Table 9: ATT FOR VARYING EMPLOYMENT EXPANSION THRESHOLDS
OLS Std. Err. ATT Std. Err.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment: Employment expansion > 1 percent
WW -.044 .003∗∗∗ -.021 .014
APD -.043 .003∗∗∗ -.017 .023
CEE -.046 .003∗∗∗ -.067 .017∗∗∗
EMU -.042 .003∗∗∗ -.031 .012∗∗
OIN -.035 .003∗∗∗ -.014 .012
Treatment: Employment expansion > 5 percent
WW -.043 .003∗∗∗ -.024 .005∗∗∗
APD -.043 .003∗∗∗ -.011 .018
CEE -.046 .003∗∗∗ -.043 .019∗∗
EMU -.041 .003∗∗∗ -.040 .012∗∗∗
OIN -.035 .003∗∗∗ -.068 .015∗∗∗
Treatment: Employment expansion > 10 percent
WW -.045 .003∗∗∗ -.018 .014
APD -.040 .004∗∗∗ -.019 .026
CEE -.046 .003∗∗∗ -.024 .018
EMU -.047 .003∗∗∗ -.018 .023
OIN -.025 .003∗∗∗ -.013 .007∗
Results for specification 4.
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed
and non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Controlling for lagged levels of MNE employ-
ment in all world regions. Analytic standard errors in parentheses: ∗ significance at ten, ∗∗
five, ∗∗∗ one percent. Treatment is foreign employment expansion, control group includes
both MNEs with no expansion and non-MNEs.
main treatment measure of foreign expansions anywhere, there are at most slight
changes to the ATT estimate within typical confidence bands. This result is consis-
tent with the idea that the foreign expansion itself is the strongest explanatory factor
for reduced separation rates, regardless of the magnitude of the expansion.
Continuous treatment variables. In a final assessment, we consider continuous
treatments and estimate their effects. Binary indicators of foreign expansions, even
when defined for alternative treatment thresholds, may conceal varying effects of
different magnitudes of foreign expansions. We consider two definitions of treat-
ment: relative foreign-employment expansions (measured as a percentage increase
of the foreign workforce over the preceding year) and foreign-employment buildups
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Increase in FDI job exposure worldwide
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI exposed and non-
FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Hirano and Imbens (2004) dose-response functions (upper panels),
with analytic confidence bands at the 5-percent level. Densities of treatment variable (lower panels)
based on Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth .1.
Figure 1: Responses to Foreign Employment Expansions
in absolute terms (counted in thousands of jobs). Hirano and Imbens (2004) derive
an extension of the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity-score method to esti-
mate the average local effects of continuous treatments. We discuss this relatively
recent method, known as generalized propensity score matching, in Appendix D.
The estimates from generalized propensity score matching are typically reported
with a so-called dose-response function. In our case, the dose-response function de-
picts the displacement probability as a function of the absolute or relative employ-
ment increase abroad. Figure 1 plots the dose-response functions (upper panels),
together with standard kernel densities (lower panels, using an Epanechnikov ker-
nel and a bandwidth of .1).
The densities in the lower panels document that the bulk of foreign expansions
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occurs for worldwide employment buildups of less than 40 percent and less than
1,500 foreign workers. In this range, foreign employment expansions reduce do-
mestic displacement probabilities and make home jobs safer. There is a point of
inflection at foreign expansions of 20 percent or more (1,500 foreign workers or
more), however, from which on the probability of home-job losses increases and
ultimately surpasses the estimated job-loss probability for zero expansions. Those
major expansions are, however, rare, as the kernel density estimates show. Even in
this upper range range of foreign expansions, the domestic displacement probability
is estimated to reach at most 16%, compared to 18% for non-MNEs.
6 Conclusion
Are home jobs safer when MNEs expand abroad than when they do not? We use
a propensity-score matching method for various measures of a domestic job’s ex-
posure to parent-firm FDI and find that FDI expansions into foreign regions sig-
nificantly decrease the probability of domestic worker separation. MNEs’ employ-
ment expansions abroad reduce the rate of domestic job loss by about two percent-
age points—or half the unconditional difference in separation rates between MNEs
(with lower separation rates) and non-MNEs. Much of the previous literature looks
at factor use within MNEs to ask how international wage differences affect MNEs’
labor demands. There is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that labor is a substi-
tute across locations within MNEs, just as labor is a substitute under cross-border
trade between firms. Our MNE and non-MNE comparison documents, however,
that MNEs are able to respond to global competition with more stable home em-
ployment policies than non-MNEs.
We perform numerous sensitivity checks and show that results are robust to
several specifications, and to various alternative control group and treatment def-
initions. We find no evidence that concomitant variables influence the estimates.
These findings make two alternative hypotheses implausible: First, although firms
might acquire an employment-augmenting ownership advantage or experience a fa-
vorable demand or productivity shock and simultaneously expand foreign employ-
ment, the magnitude of this unobserved effect would have to be implausibly large
to overturn our results. Second, there is no evidence for the alternative hypothesis
that simultaneous sector-wide changes, such as trends in foreign trade, determine
the treatment effect. So, the most plausible explanation for lower separation rates
at FDI-expanding firms is their FDI expansion itself. The data do not allow us to
discern involuntary layoffs from voluntary quits so that the added job security at
firms with foreign expansions can be employer or worker initiated, or both.
We conclude that there is no empirical evidence on domestic job security that
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would justify interventions to hinder the formation of MNEs. To the contrary, our
findings are consistent with the idea that preventing domestic MNEs from exploit-
ing international wage differentials in house, or hampering MNEs’ access to for-
eign product markets through FDI, would increase domestic worker separations at
MNEs.
Appendix
A Linked employer-employee data
We link jobs to their FDI exposure throughout German corporate groups. This
requires a two-step procedure. First, we identify all MIDI firms that are in the com-
mercial company structure database MARKUS. Departing from the MIDI firms in
MARKUS, we move both down and up in the corporate hierarchy of MARKUS to
select the affiliates and ultimate parents of the MIDI firms. Second, we string-match
all domestic plants in the BA worker database to the so-selected MARKUS firms for
identification of all plants related to FDI-conducting firms. We also string-match
the domestic plants to MIDI itself for identification of all those FDI reporting firms
that are not part of a corporate group (but stand-alone firms).
We link the data based on names and addresses. By law, German plant names
must include the firm name (but may be augmented with qualifiers). Before we start
the string-match routine, we remove clearly unrelated qualifiers (such as manager
names or municipalities) from plant names, and non-significance bearing compo-
nents from plant and firm names (such as the legal form) in order to compute a
link-quality index on the basis of highly identifying name components. Our string-
match script computes link-quality indices as the percentage of words that coincide
between any pair of names. We take a conservative approach to avoid erroneous
links. We keep two clearly separate subsets of the original data: First, plants that
are perfect links to MARKUS or MIDI, i.e. plant names that agree with firm names
in every single letter. Second, plants that are perfect non-links, i.e. plant names that
have no single word in common with any FDI-related MARKUS or MIDI firm. We
drop all plants with a link-quality index between zero and one from our sample, i.e.
plants whose name partially corresponds to an FDI firm name but not perfectly so.
Those plants cannot be told to be either treatment or control plants without risk of
misclassification.22 The procedure leaves us with a distinct treatment group of FDI
22The string-match routine runs for several weeks, checking 3.8 million plants against 65,000 FDI
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Example 1: Example 2:













Figure 2: Examples of Corporate Groups
plants and a distinct control group of non-FDI plants.
The BA plant name file dates from November 2002 and contains names of plants
that are no longer active so that we know exiting and entering plants. It is partic-
ularly important to capture exits after 1999 because one margin of separation is
plant closure. Firm names in the MARKUS database are from three vintages of data,
November 2000, November 2001 and November 2002. This is to make sure that in
case of name changes in one of the years 2000 through 2002, we do not miss string
matches.
Our procedure is designed to remove laterally related firms (sisters, aunts, or
nieces) from the sample so that they neither enter the treatment nor the control
group. Take Example 1 of Figure 2 and consider firm 201 to be the FDI-conducting
(and FDI-reporting) firm in the depicted corporate group. The first step of our
procedure identifies firm 201 in MARKUS and its affiliate and parent 908 and 101
but does not identify firms 202 (a sister to 201) and 909 (a niece to 201). If any
name component of plants in firms 202 or 909 coincides with those of 101, 201 or
908 (but the plant name is not an identical match to 101, 201 or 908), the plants
in firms 202 and 909 are discarded and neither enter the treatment nor the control
group. If no single name component of plants in firms 202 or 909 is the same as that
of 101, 201 or 908, the plant may enter our control group. If one considers sisters,
aunts, and nieces with no single identical name component to be equally affected by
FDI of firm 201 as those with common names or direct relations, their inclusion in
the control group would make the control group more similar to the treatment group
than it should be. If anything, however, the reduced difference would work against
our outcome estimates. Moreover, interlocking (of which Example 2 of Figure 2 is
a special case) limits the number of only laterally related firms.
firms. It is infeasible to manually treat possible links with imperfect link-quality rates.
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Table 10: Ownership Inference
Affiliate-parent Iteration (Length of Walk)
pair 1 2 3 5 9 100
201-101 .9 .90 .900 .92250 .92306 .92308
201-202 .1 .00000
201-301 .05 .00125
202-101 .225 .22500 .23077 .23077
202-201 .25 .00625
202-301 .5 .00000
301-101 .45 .450 .46125 .46153 .46154
301-201 .5 .00000
301-202 .05 .00125
909-101 .54 .540 .64350 .64609 .64615
909-201 .6 .100 .00006 .00000
909-202 .4 .06 .00150 .00000
909-301 .20 .030 .00500 .00001
B Corporate ownership and FDI exposure
We infer the economically relevant ownership share of a domestic firm in any other
domestic firm. The relevant ownership share can differ from the recorded share
in a firm’s equity for two reasons. First, a firm may hold indirect shares in an
affiliate via investments in third firms who in turn control a share of the affiliate. We
call ownership shares that sum all direct and indirect shares cumulated ownership
shares. Second, corporate structures may exhibit cross ownership of a firm in itself
via affiliates who in turn are parents of the firm itself. We call ownership shares
that remove such circular ownership relations consolidated ownership shares. This
appendix describes the procedure in intuitive terms; proofs based on graph theory
are available from the authors upon request.
Consolidation removes the degree of self-ownership (α) from affiliates, or in-
termediate firms between parents and affiliates, and rescales the ultimate ownership
share of the parent to account for the increased control in partly self-owning affil-
iates or intermediate firms (with a factor of 1/(1−α)). Investors know that their
share in a firm, which partly owns itself through cross ownership, in fact controls a
larger part of the firm’s assets and its affiliates’ assets than the recorded share would
indicate. In this regard, cross ownership is like self-ownership. Just as stock buy-
backs increase the value of the remaining stocks because investors’ de facto equity
share rises, so do cross-ownership relations raise the de facto level of control of the
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parents outside the cross-ownership circle.
We are interested in ultimate parents that are not owned by other domestic firms,
and want to infer their cumulated and consolidated ownership in all affiliates. Con-
sider the following example of interlocking (Example 2 in Figure 2). The ultimate
parent with firm ID 101 holds 90 percent in firm 201, which is also owned by firm
202 for the remaining 10 percent. However, firm 201 itself holds a 25 percent stake
in firm 202—via its holdings of 50 percent of 301, which has a 50 percent stake in
201. Firms 201 and 202 hold 60 percent and 40 percent of firm 909. Our cumula-
tion and consolidation procedure infers the ultimate ownership of 101 in all other
firms.
We assemble the corporate ownership data in a three-column matrix:23 the first
column takes the affiliate ID, the second column the parent ID, and the third column
the effective ownership share. Table 10 shows this matrix for Example 2 in Figure 2
(the third column with the direct ownership share is labelled 1, representing the
single iteration 1).
On the basis of this ownership matrix, our inference procedure walks through
the corporate labyrinth for a prescribed number of steps (or iterations). The pro-
cedure multiplies the ownership shares along the edges of the walk, and cumulates
multiple walks from a given affiliate to a given ultimate parent. Say, we prescribe
that the algorithm take all walks of length two between every possible affiliate-
parent pair (in business terms: two firm levels up in the group’s corporate hierarchy;
in mathematical terms: walks from any vertex to another vertex that is two edges
away in the directed graph).
We choose the following trick to infer the cumulated and consolidated owner-
ship for ultimate parents: we assign every ultimate parent a 100 percent ownership
of itself. This makes the procedure cumulate and consolidate the effective owner-
ship share for all affiliates of ultimate parents, at any length of walks. There are
seven distinct possibilities in the example to move in two steps through the corpo-
rate labyrinth. Table 10 lists these possibilities as iteration 2 (all entries in or below
the second row). With our trick, there is now an eighth possibility to move from
affiliate 201 to parent 101 in two steps because we have added the 101-101 loop
with 100-percent ownership. As a result, our procedure cumulates ownerships of
ultimate parents for all walks that are of length two or shorter. The procedure starts
to consolidate shares as the length of the walk increases. Iteration 3 in Table 10
shows the cumulated and partially consolidated ownership of ultimate parent 101
in affiliate 201, for all three-step walks, including the first cycle from 201 through
202 and 301 back to 201 and then to 101.
23We assemble cleared ownership data by first removing one-to-one reverse ownerships and self-
ownerships in nested legal forms (such as Gmbh & Co. KG).
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APD Asia-Pacific Developing countries
including China, Mongolia and North Korea;
including Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan;
including dominions of OIN and EMU countries;
excluding South Asia (India, Pakistan)
CEE Central and Eastern European countries
including EU accession countries and candidates
excluding Russia and Central Asian economies
EMU European Monetary Union participants
12 EU members that participate in Euro in 2001
excluding Denmark, Sweden, the UK and CEE countries
(non-participating EMU signatories)
OIN Overseas Industrialized counries
including Canada, Japan, USA, Australia, New Zealand
OTHER REGIONS
ODV Other Developing countries
including South Asia (India/Pakistan), Africa, Latin
America, the Middle East; and EMU, OIN, OWE dominions
OWE Other Western European countries including
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK
RCA Russia and Central Asian economies;
In 2000, the maximum length of direct (non-circular) walks from any firm to
another firm is 21. So, for all ultimate parents, the cumulated and consolidated
ownership shares are reported correctly from a sufficiently large number of itera-
tions on. Table 10 shows iteration 100. The ownership share of 101 in 201 has
converged to the correct measure (.9/(1− .1 · .5 · .5) = .923076) at five-digit pre-
cision. Firm 101 controls 92.3 percent of firm 201’s assets, among them firm 201’s
foreign affiliates.
To calculate the FDI exposure at any hierarchy level in the corporate group,
we use a single-weighting scheme with ownership shares. The economic rationale
behind single-weighting is that ultimate parents are more likely to be the corporate
decision units (whereas FDI conducting and reporting firms in the group may be
created for tax and liability purposes). We first assign FDI exposure measures from
domestic affiliates to their ultimate domestic parents. Our exposure measures are
foreign affiliate employment and turnover by foreign region (see Table 11 for the
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definition of regions). Suppose firm 201 in Example 2 of Figure 2 conducts FDI
in the corporate group. We assign 92.3 percent of 201’s FDI exposure to firm 101,
the ultimate domestic parent. We then assign the same 92.3 percent of 201’s FDI
exposure to all affiliates of 101 (201 itself, 202, 301, 909). So, jobs throughout the
group (including those at 201 itself) are only affected to the degree that the ultimate
parents can control foreign-affiliate employment (or turnover). We assign only 92.3
percent of 201’s FDI exposure to 201 itself because the ultimate parent only has
92.3 percent of the control over employment at 201.24
For we choose single-weighting in the domestic branches of the MNE, we also
single-weight foreign-affiliate employment (and turnover) by the ownership share
of the domestic parent in its foreign affiliates. Mirroring the minimal ownership
threshold of 10 percent in the MIDI data on foreign affiliates, we also discard domes-
tic affiliates with ownership shares of less than 10 percent in our singe-weighting
assignment of FDI exposure to domestic jobs throughout the corporate group.
C Rosenbaum bounds for binary outcomes
We outline the idea behind Rosenbaum (2002) bounds. Rewrite the probability that
job i with observed characteristics xi is treated with an FDI expansion to:
p (xi) = Pr(di=1|xi) = F (βxi + γui), (C1)
where ui is the unobserved variable of concern (a newly acquired ownership ad-
vantage, for instance) and γ is the effect of ui on the treatment probability. If the
estimator is free of hidden bias, γ is zero and the participation probability is solely
determined by xi. However, if there is hidden bias, two jobs with the same observed
covariates x have differing chances of receiving treatment. Take a matched pair of
observations i and j, and consider the logistic distribution F . The odds that the jobs
24An alternative assignment scheme would be double-weighting, first weighting FDI exposure
by ownership and then assigning the FDI exposure to jobs throughout the corporate group using
ownership weights again. We decide against double-weighting. Any weighting scheme results in
exposure measures that are weakly monotonically decreasing as one moves upwards in the corporate
hierarchy because ownership shares are weakly less than one. Double-weighting aggravates this
property. Revisit Example 1 in Figure 2 and suppose firm 201 conducts FDI. Single-weighting
assigns 50 percent of 201’s exposure to affiliate 908, double-weighting only 12.5 percent. If 908
itself conducts the FDI, single-weighting assigns 25 percent of its own FDI exposure to 908, double-
weighting only 6.25 percent. In economic terms, double-weighting downplays the decision power
of intermediate hierarchies in the corporate group further than single-weighting so that we favor
single-weighting. Recall that purely laterally related firms (sisters, aunts and nieces) are excluded
from our treatment group so that firms 202 and 909 in Example 1 of Figure 2 are not relevant for the
choice of weighting scheme.
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receive treatment are p (xi)/(1 − p (xi)) and p (xj)/(1 − p (xj)) so that the odds






p (xi)(1− p (xj))
p (xj)(1− p (xi)) =
exp (βxi + γui)
exp (βxj + γuj)
= exp[γ(ui − uj)]. (C2)
If both jobs share the same observed covariates after propensity-score matching, the
x-vector cancels. The jobs nevertheless differ in their odds of receiving treatment by
a factor that involves the parameter γ and the difference in the unobserved variable
u. It is the objective of sensitivity analysis to evaluate how inference about the
treatment effect is altered by changing the values of γ and (ui − uj).
Assume for the sake of simplicity that the unobserved covariate is an indicator
variable with ui ∈ {0, 1} (indicating the acquisition of an ownership advantage).
Rosenbaum (2002) shows that equation (C2) then implies the following bounds on






(1− p (xi)) ≤ e
γ. (C3)
The two matched jobs have the same probability of being treated only if the odds
ratio eγ = 1. If the odds ratio eγ = 2, then individuals who appear to be similar
(in terms of x), could differ in their odds of receiving the treatment by as much as a
factor of 2.
We compute critical values of the odds ratio eγ based on the Mantel and Haen-
szel (1959) test statistic, as suggested by Rosenbaum (2002). The Mantel and Haen-
szel test statistic assesses the strength of hidden bias that would be necessary to
overturn our ATT estimate.
The non-parametric Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test compares the successful
number of individuals in the treatment group to the same expected number under
the null hypothesis that the treatment effect is zero. Denote with N1s and N0s the
numbers of treated and non-treated individuals in stratum s, where Ns = N0s+N1s.
y1s is the number of treated jobs with a separation outcome, y0s is the number of
non-treated jobs with a separation outcome, and ys is the number of total sepa-
rations in stratum s. The MH test-statistic QMH asymptotes the standard normal

















Our propensity-score matching procedure minimizes differences between treat-
ment and control group observations so that the MH test (designed for random
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samples) is applicable. Take the possible influence of a binary hidden variable with
an effect eγ > 1 on the outcome. For fixed eγ > 1, Rosenbaum (2002) shows that
the MH test statistic QMH can be bounded by two known distributions. If eγ = 1,
the bounds are equal to the baseline scenario of no hidden bias. With increasing eγ ,
the bounds move apart, reflecting uncertainty about the test statistic in the presence
of unobserved selection bias.
Consider two scenarios. First, let Q+MH be the test statistic given that we overes-
timate the treatment effect and, second, let Q−MH the case where we underestimate






















where E˜s and V ar(E˜s) are the large sample approximations to the expectation and
variance of the number of successful participants when the hidden variable is binary
and γ given.25
D Generalized propensity scores
Index a sample of jobs with i = 1, . . . , N and consider the unit-level dose-response
function of outcomes Yi(t) as a function of treatments t ∈ T . In the binary treat-
ment case T = {0, 1}. In the continuous case, we allow T to be an interval
[t0, t1]. We restrict t0 > 0 to study the range of employment expansions that we
used to summarize with a treatment indicator of one and in order to exclude the
probability mass at zero treatment in accordance with the Hirano and Imbens ap-
proach. We are interested in the average dose-response function across all jobs i,
µ(t) = E[Yi(t)]. We observe the vector Xi, the treatment Ti, and the outcome cor-
responding to the level of treatment received, Yi = Yi(Ti). We drop the index i
for simplicity and assume that Y (t)t∈T , T,X are defined on a common probability




1) − E˜s[(eγ − 1)(N1s + ys) + Ns] + eγysN1s, after addition of max(0, ys + N1s − Ns ≤
E˜s ≤ min(ys, N1s)) to select the root. E˜−s follows by replacing eγ with 1/eγ . The large
sample approximation to the variance is V ar(E˜s) = [1/E˜s + 1/(ys − E˜s) + 1/(N1s − E˜s) +
1/(Ns − ys −N1s + E˜s)]−1.
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space, that t is continuously distributed with respect to a Lebesgue measure on T ,
and that Y = Y (T ) is a well defined random variable.
In this setting, the definition of unconfoundedness (4) for binary treatments gen-
eralizes to weak unconfoundedness for continuous treatments
Y (t) ⊥ T |X for all t ∈ T . (D1)
Jobs differ in their characteristics x so that they are more or less likely to be ex-
posed to FDI expansions. The weak unconfoundedness assumption says that, af-
ter controlling for observable characteristics X , any remaining difference in FDI
expansions T across jobs is independent of the potential outcomes Y (t). Assump-
tion (D1) is called weak unconfoundedness because it does not require joint inde-
pendence of all potential outcomes, Y (t)t∈[t0,t1], T,X . Instead, it requires condi-
tional independence to hold at every treatment level.
Hirano and Imbens (2004) define the generalized propensity score (GPS) as
R = r(T,X), (D2)
where r(t, x) = fT |X(t|x) is the conditional density of the treatment given the
covariates. The GPS is assumed to have a balancing property similar to that of the
conventional propensity score under binary treatment: within strata with the same
value of r(t,X), the probability that T = t does not depend on the value of X . In
other words, when looking at two jobs with the same probability (conditional on
observable characteristics X) of being exposed to a particular FDI expansion, their
treatment level is independent of X . That is, the GPS summarizes all information
in the multi-dimensional vector X so that
X ⊥ 1{T = t}|r(t,X).
This is a mechanical property of the GPS, and does not require unconfoundedness.
In combination with unconfoundedness, the balancing property implies that assign-
ment to treatment is weakly unconfounded given the generalized propensity score
(see Hirano and Imbens (2004) for a proof): if assignment to the treatment is weakly
unconfounded given pre-treatment variables X , then
fT (t|r(t,X), y(T )) = fT (t|r(t,X)) (D3)
for every t. This result says that we can evaluate the GPS at a given treatment
level by considering the conditional density of the respective treatment level t. In
that sense we use as many propensity scores as there are treatment levels, but never
more than a single score at one treatment level.
We eliminate biases associated with differences in the covariates in two steps
(for a proof that the procedure removes bias, see Hirano and Imbens (2004)):
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1. Estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome as a function of two
scalar variables, the treatment level T and the GPS R, β(t, r) = E[y|T =
t, R = r]
2. Estimate the dose-response function at a particular level of the treatment by
averaging this conditional expectation over the GPS at that particular level of
the treatment, µ(t) = E[β(t, r(t,X))].
It is important to note that, in the second step, we do not average over the GPS
R = r(t,X); rather we average over the score evaluated at the treatment level of
interest, r(t,X). In other words, we fix t and average over Xi and r(t,Xi) ∀i.
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Table 12: RAW SEPARATION PROBABILITIES BY SECTOR AND REGION OF FDI EXPOSURE
WW APD CEE EMU ODV OIN OWE RCA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
plants without FDI exposure in region l
food and tobacco .217 .207 .210 .215 .208 .208 .209 .207
textile, apparel, leather .203 .201 .197 .199 .193 .196 .194 .191
wood and paper products .210 .189 .192 .200 .191 .195 .196 .191
chemicals .136 .139 .135 .140 .142 .140 .141 .142
non-metallic products .154 .152 .149 .153 .151 .152 .151 .146
metallic products .172 .162 .160 .170 .162 .162 .167 .156
non-electrical machinery .138 .136 .138 .135 .137 .136 .133 .132
electronics and optic. equipmt. .168 .182 .179 .171 .176 .176 .174 .170
transportation equipm. .166 .146 .144 .153 .150 .153 .143 .120
other manufacturing .219 .206 .208 .217 .206 .208 .213 .205
plants with FDI exposure relative to plants without FDI exposure
food and tobacco -.066 -.048 -.058 -.065 -.046 -.042 -.044 -.047
textile, apparel, leather -.037 -.102 -.039 -.028 -.027 -.037 -.033 -.056
wood and paper products -.071 -.026 -.031 -.053 -.046 -.061 -.051 -.062
chemicals .039 .046 .058 .035 .035 .043 .036 .082
non-metallic products -.020 -.031 -.008 -.021 -.022 -.026 -.017 -.001
metallic products -.056 -.060 -.039 -.056 -.058 -.046 -.060 -.049
non-electrical machinery -.001 .004 -.003 .005 .000 .004 .012 .034
electronics and optic. equipmt. .005 -.043 -.030 -.002 -.022 -.016 -.014 .001
transportation equipm. -.070 -.061 -.048 -.058 -.063 -.065 -.048 -.021
other manufacturing -.067 -.046 -.043 -.075 -.043 -.049 -.069 -.044
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI-exposed and non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Locations (see Table 11): WW
(World-Wide abroad), APD (Asia-Pacific Developing countries), CEE (Central and Eastern European countries), EMU (European Monetary Union member countries), ODV (Other
Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), OWE (Other Western European countries), and RCA (Russia and Central Asian countries).
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Table 13: RAW SEPARATION PROBABILITIES BY SECTOR AND REGION OF FDI EXPANSION
WW APD CEE EMU ODV OIN OWE RCA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
plants without FDI exposure in region l
food and tobacco .211 .207 .207 .210 .206 .207 .208 .208
textile, apparel, leather .198 .195 .193 .197 .189 .193 .197 .190
wood and paper products .195 .189 .193 .192 .190 .188 .192 .188
chemicals .160 .144 .152 .153 .149 .151 .138 .148
non-metallic products .152 .147 .146 .150 .153 .151 .149 .147
metallic products .164 .159 .162 .169 .153 .155 .160 .155
non-electrical machinery .138 .136 .137 .133 .138 .133 .130 .139
electronics and optic. equipmt. .176 .181 .179 .177 .176 .174 .177 .170
transportation equipm. .147 .134 .149 .145 .130 .139 .129 .116
other manufacturing .204 .207 .201 .201 .204 .204 .208 .206
plants with FDI exposure relative to plants without FDI exposure
food and tobacco -.053 -.047 -.038 -.054 -.062 -.041 -.045 -.069
textile, apparel, leather -.035 -.084 -.019 -.045 .012 -.035 -.097 .060
wood and paper products -.054 -.035 -.052 -.045 -.066 -.040 -.044 -.062
chemicals -.021 .036 .002 -.002 .020 .007 .067 .029
non-metallic products -.025 -.009 -.001 -.017 -.044 -.041 -.017 -.012
metallic products -.052 -.066 -.056 -.074 -.030 -.030 -.052 -.054
non-electrical machinery -.003 .003 -.002 .014 -.006 .014 .034 -.022
electronics and optic. equipmt. -.022 -.048 -.041 -.024 -.036 -.014 -.059 .003
transportation equipm. -.049 -.052 -.060 -.054 -.048 -.046 -.031 .003
other manufacturing -.022 -.058 .012 .010 -.031 -.061 -.062 -.090
Sources: Linked MIDI and BA data, t = 2000. 5% random sample of workers in FDI-exposed and non-FDI exposed manufacturing plants. Locations (see Table 11): WW
(World-Wide abroad), APD (Asia-Pacific Developing countries), CEE (Central and Eastern European countries), EMU (European Monetary Union member countries), ODV (Other
Developing countries), OIN (Overseas Industrialized countries), OWE (Other Western European countries), and RCA (Russia and Central Asian countries).
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